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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to analyze the impact of institutions on the economic 
growth and examine whether the ultimate impact differs at various stages of 
development among 24 Asian countries over the period 1996-2008 using a 
dynamic panel data analysis model based on the SYS-GMM estimation 
procedure. The overall analysis of this study shows that institutions indeed are 
important in determining the long-run economic growth. However, the impact of 
the institutions on economic growth varies across the regions and depends upon 
the existence level of development. This study concludes that the institutions are 
more effective in developed region as compared to developing region. More 
specially, control over corruption, rule of law and regulatory quality are highly 
effective in promoting long rum economic growth in East Asia than South Asia. 
Different countries require different set of institutions to promote long run 
economic growth 
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1 This paper is heavily drawn from my PhD Dissertation entitled “Institutions, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth”  
submitted for review 
INTRODUCTION 
After the path breaking studies by North (1981), Jones (1981) and Olson (1981) that 
inspired the researchers and policy makers, a large amount of literature empirically investigates 
the impact of institutions on economic growth and development. For example, earlier empirical 
studies, by Knack and Keefer (1995) employing data for 97 countries over the period 1974-1989, 
Mauro (1995) using cross-section data for 67 countries and Barro (1996) using data over the 
period 1960-1990, reveal that institutions are important for investment and long run economic 
growth and development. Hall and Jones (1999), based on a cross section study of 127 countries, 
demonstrate that differences in the institutions across the globe cause huge differences in capital 
accumulation, education attainment, and productivity growth hence accounted for income 
differences. More recently, Rodrik et al. (2004) find that rule of law, a as proxy for institutions, 
has a positive impact on economic growth. Acemoglue et al. (2006) conclude that private 
property right institutions are the main determinants of long run economic growth, investment 
and financial development. 
These studies conclude that institutions are the fundamental cause of the long run 
economic growth and development across the countries. The existing empirical literature, 
however, is only evident that institutions positively affect the economic growth and 
development. But, the role of institutions is not univocal for economic growth as it is described 
through various factors like the perception of the individual about the institutions themselves and 
the social norms and community rules of a particular group of individuals. Some time similar 
institutions produced extremely different outcomes across different groups, regions and societies. 
This is evident in LAC countries where similar laws and solutions were adopted, obtaining 
different economic growth and development (Lin and Nugent, 1995). In this context, Alonso and 
Garcimsrtin (2010) signify the role of stages of development in determining the growth effects of 
institutions.  
The existing literature that empirically investigates the growth effects of institutions 
mainly ignores the potential influence of various stages of development in this regard2. The 
overall objective of this study is, therefore, to analyze the impact of institutions on economic 
growth at the different stages of the economic development. More specifically, this study 
examines the relationship between the institutions and the economic growth for 24 Asian 
countries over the period 1996-2008. Secondly, this study investigates whether the ultimate 
impact differs at various stages of economic development. To overcome the problem of 
endogeniety and non-observable country specific effects, this study employs a dynamic panel 
data analysis model based on the “System Generalized Method of Moments” (SYS-GMM) 
estimation technique. Moreover, this study uses only Asian countries with almost homogenous 
characteristics.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follow: Section 2 explains the theoretical 
framework capturing the relationship between the institutions and the economic growth. Data 
and estimation methodology are elaborated in section 3. Empirical results are presented in 
section 4 while section 5 concludes the entire discussion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 More recently Valerianiand and Peluso (2011) investigate the growth effects of institutions at various stages of 
development. However, this study neither accounted for the possibility of endogeniety problem nor for the 
possibility of heterogeneity problem due to combining many different countries those are highlighted in various 
studies in this field. 
MODELLING INSTITUIONS-GROWTH NEXUS 
Economic theory postulates that per capita level of output is determined by the amount of 
physical and human capital and  level of technology in a country. In this process, the economic 
growth is linked with the ability of the nation to enhance its physical and human capital along 
with the development in the level of technology. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010), however, state 
that: 
“The differences in human capital, physical capital, and technology 
are only proximate causes in the sense that they pose the next question of 
why some countries have less human capital, physical capital, and 
technology and make worse use of their factors and opportunities. To 
develop more satisfactory answer to question of why some countries are 
much richer than others and why some countries grow much faster than 
others, we need to look for potential fundamental causes, which may be 
underlying these proximate differences across countries” 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) argue that “institutions are the fundamental causes of the 
long run economic growth and the development across the countries”. North (1990) defines 
institutions as “the rule of the game in a society or, more formally the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”. This implies that institutions shape the incentive 
structure in the society that may increase or hamper the economic activities. Poor institutions 
may slow down the economic activities by providing room to economic agents to remain busy in 
redistributive politics with lower economic returns rather than growth promoting economic 
activities (Murphy et al. 1991). On the other hand, good institutions may promote such incentive 
structure that leads to higher economic growth via reducing uncertainty and promoting efficiency 
(North, 1991). Overall productivity of factors of production in a country is driven by the quality 
of its institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999). Efficient, well developed and uncorrupt institutions 
guarantees that labor can only be used for productive objectives and not wasted in rent seeking 
activities, thus leads to higher economic growth (North, 1990). Institutions enhance the ability of 
a country in adopting new technologies invented elsewhere. This adoption may play an important 
role in upgrading the overall development of the country in the globe (Bernard and Jones, 1996).  
This discussion highlights the significant role of the institution in determining the long 
run economic growth and the development across the economies and regions. The relationship 
between institution and economic growth can be derived using standard growth regression model 
(Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). The extended version of basic growth equation incorporating 
the role of institution is as follow: 
   	 
 	  	  
Where  represents growth rate of real GDP,  is real output, represents 
institutions,   is a set of explanatory variables,  is slope coefficients attached with explanatory 
variables and is the error term. The choice of explanatory variables mainly based on the 
existing studies. In this paper, we use variables related to initial conditions, human capital, 
physical capital and macroeconomic stability. 
Initial conditions are important to test the convergence hypothesis. According to neo-
classical school of thought, per capita growth rate of the countries inversely related to the initial 
income implying that poor countries tend to grow faster as compared to rich ones hence there is 
convergence across the countries. Similarly neoclassical model uses investment and population 
growth as explanatory variables (Barro, 1990). Increase in investment and decrease in population 
growth may lead to higher economic growth. Macroeconomic stability generally measures 
through inflation, government size and trade openness3. This formulation combines various 
growth theories developed by various economists like Solow (1956), Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) with North (1981). Based on this formulation, the final regression model for cross section 
analysis is as follow: 
     	 
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Where 
 with positive sign is the coefficient attached with institutions  for 
country#.  is the initial level of income for country # and 
the coefficient attached with 
initial income and the expected sign of 
 is negative which shows the convergence.  
represents the investment as percent of GDP for country # and   $ % is slope coefficient where 
as ! represent level of inflation for country # and   & % is coefficient measuring impact of 
! on economic growth. For panel data analysis, we use following regression model: 
'(   	 
'( 	 
'( 	 '( 	  )'( 	 *+),'( 	 -'( 	 '( . 
Where 
 with positive sign is the coefficient attached with institutions '( for 
country# and time/. '( is the initial level of income for country # and time/ with 
 $ %.  
'( represents the investment as percent of GDP for country # and time/ with   $ %. )'( 
represents population growth for country # and time/ with   & %. +),'( represents openness 
for country # and time/ with  * $ %. '( represents government expenditure as percent of 
GDP for country # and time/ with  - & %.  
                                                          
3 The choice of control variables mainly comes from the Levine and Renelt (1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) 
ESTIAMTION METHDOLOGY AND DATA 
Estimation Methodology 
The choice of appropriate estimation technique is important for obtaining robust 
estimates. The existing literature mainly uses cross section approach to estimate the impact of 
institutions on economic growth. However, this formulation ignores the country specific aspects 
of the data that may be linked with explanatory variables, causing an omitted variables bias. The 
main assumption in cross section approach is the strict exogeneity of explanatory variables that 
may be violated in many cases. Although this problem can be tackled using instrumental 
variables technique. But it is vary difficult to find valid instrument. The problem of omitted 
variables can also be tackled employing a panel approach. The time invariant or constant   
heterogeneity across the countries of a panel can be removed using the panel estimation 
technique based on the fixed effect approach. However, the effects that change with time of the 
economy and endogeniety may not be tackled using this estimation procedure. 
In order to tackle the above mention problems, Caselli et al. (1996) and, later on, Bond et 
al. (2001) apply the “Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)”. This method corrects the 
unobserved heterogeneity of the country, excluded variables bias, the existence of measurement 
errors, and the possibility of potential endogeniety problem. Arellano and Bover (1995) 
constructed the “System GMM” approach, reduces the problem arises due to small sample i.e. 
small sample bias that persist in the first difference model of the GMM employ by Caselli et al. 
(1996). Later on, same procedure was used by Blundell and Bond (1998) to tackle the same 
problems. 
Taking this in account, to estimate the impact of the institutions on the economic growth, 
this study employs a dynamic panel data analysis model based on the “System Generalized 
Method of Moments” (SYS-GMM) estimation technique. This methodology takes into accounts 
possibility of: i) “the time dimensions of the data, ii) non-observable country specific effects, iii) 
inclusion of lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables and iv) the problem of 
enodogeniety among all explanatory variables”. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In this paper, the empirical estimation is based on the panel data set for 24 Asian 
countries over the period 1996-2008. The choice of 24 countries in Asian region is mainly 
because of the availability of data on all variables (See Appendix Table A for detail list of 
countries).  We include 8 countries from South Asia region, 6 countries from East Asia region 
and 10 countries from South East Asia region. 
The data on economic variables are taken from the World Bank’s “World Development 
Indicators (WDI)” and the “Penn World Table version 7.0 – PWT” published by Heston et al. 
(2010). Data on institutional variables are gathered from the World Bank’s “Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI)”. This database provides six different measures that capture the 
various dimensions of institutions including: i) “Voice and Accountability”, ii) “Political 
instability and Violence”, iii) “Government Effectiveness”, iv) “Rule of  Law”, v) “Regulatory  
Quality” and iv) “Control of  corruption”4. The overall institutional quality index is developed by 
using principle component method. 
                                                          
4 For detailed definition and construction of these variables see World  Bank website: 
www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
The descriptive statistics shows that the average per capita GDP in the Asia is 10678 US 
$. The average GDP per capita growth rate is 3.80 while population growth rate is 1.64 in the 
region. Investment as percent of GDP ranges from 9.81 percent to 68.3 percent.  The average 
values of institutional measures are ranging from -0.50 of Voice and Accountability to -0.04 of 
Rule of Law (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real GDP per Capita (R_GDP_PC) 312 10678 14485 370 53102 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate (R_GDP_PC_G) 312 3.80 4.28 -14.29 24.43 
Population Growth Rate (Pop_G) 312 1.64 0.83 -1.48 5.32 
Government as % of GDP (Gov_GDP) 312 11.04 6.37 2.10 42.72 
Investment as % of GDP (I_GDP) 312 27.91 10.47 9.81 68.31 
Openness (Opn) 312 108.59 88.08 19.49 443.18 
Control of Corruption (C_C) 312 -0.22 0.96 -1.92 2.39 
Rule and Law (R_L) 312 -0.04 0.96 -2.32 2.37 
Regulatory Quality (R_Q) 312 -0.29 1.07 -2.73 1.37 
Government Effectiveness (G_E) 312 -0.11 1.01 -2.38 2.23 
Political Stability (P_S) 312 -0.13 0.83 -1.97 1.76 
Voice and Accountability (V_A) 312 -0.50 0.77 -2.30 1.05 
Overall Institutional Index (INS) 312 0.00 2.16 -4.97 4.67 
  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The results of empirical analysis are presented in table 2-5. To uncover the nature of 
relationship between institutional variables and economic growth, first we carry cross sectional 
analysis and results are presented in table 2. The baseline model which only includes control 
variables other than institutions shows that all the explanatory variables have expected signs (see 
column 1 table 2). The initial level of GDP per capita of the economies has a negative coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
which shows consistent results with the conditional income convergence hypothesis among the 
countries. Investment has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that the 
greater investment promote economic growth. Inflation has positive but insignificant impact on 
economic growth (Table 2).  
 
TABLE 1 
Cross-section estimation OLS (1996-2008) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Mode 8 
Initial R_GDP_PC -0.224* -0.207* -0.245 -0.215 -0.247* -0.221 -0.242 -0.221 
 (0.113) (0.117) (0.164) (0.140) (0.137) (0.156) (0.144) (0.148) 
Inf 0.00503 0.00189 0.00447 0.00438 0.00718 0.00489 0.00588 0.00485 
 (0.0258) (0.0264) (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0269) 
I_GDP 1.384** 1.281** 1.328** 1.392** 1.400** 1.389** 1.351** 1.387** 
 (0.504) (0.528) (0.599) (0.523) (0.519) (0.550) (0.540) (0.525) 
V_A  -0.134       
  (0.181)       
P_S   0.0363**      
   (0.198)      
G_E    -0.0210     
    (0.192)     
R_Q     0.0557    
     (0.178)    
R_L      0.00712*   
      (0.250)   
C_C       0.0407**  
       (0.192)  
INS        0.00320** 
        (0.0890) 
Constant -1.456 -1.318 -1.089 -1.551 -1.330 -1.498 -1.197 -1.492 
 (1.977) (2.008) (2.851) (2.204) (2.062) (2.499) (2.366) (2.264) 
         
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.403 0.420 0.405 0.404 0.407 0.403 0.405 0.404 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
From column 2 to 8, we test the hypothesis whether institutions play significant role in 
promoting economic growth across the countries. We find a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between various indicators of institutions and per capita GDP growth rate implying 
that institutions are important in promoting the long run economic growth in the Asian 
economies. More specifically we find that the ‘political stability’, the ‘rule of law’ and the 
‘control over corruption’ are the significant growth determinants. The composite indicator of 
institutional quality has positive and significant impact on economic growth, indicating that 
better the quality of institution across the countries, higher the GDP per capita (Table 2).  
Panel estimation is carried out using system-GMM estimations. The results of system-
GMM using a sample using entire sample of 24 Asian countries is presented in Table 3. The 
outcomes of the estimation of the baseline model are given in column 1. All the explanatory 
variables have expected sign in baseline model. Initial GDP per capita has negative sign which 
confirms convergence hypothesis. Trade openness has a positive and statistically significant 
impact on the economic growth.  Investment (percent of GDP) has a positive coefficient, but is 
not statistically significant. Population growth shoes a negative association with economic 
growth. The estimated coefficient of population growth is statistically significant at 5 percent 
level. Finally, government size (government expenditure as percent of GDP) has a negative 
impact on economic growth  
Looking at the panel estimates in Table 3, we find a positive and statistically significant 
impact of overall institutions on economic growth. ‘Control of corruption’ and ‘rule of law’ both 
have statistically significant and positive effect on the economic growth in the full sample 
estimation. The estimated coefficient for ‘control of corruption’ is 0.42 (significant at 5 percent) 
and for the ‘rule of law’ is 0.821(significant at 1 percent). ‘Regulatory quality’, ‘government 
effectiveness’, ‘political stability’ and ‘voice and accountability’ all have expected positive sign, 
but are statistically insignificant in full sample.  
TABLE 3 
Panel estimation for full sample SYS-GMM (1996-2008) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Mode 8 
R_GDP_PC
(-1) 
0.121 0.124 0.120 0.124 0.126 0.122 0.121 0.124 
 (0.0780) (0.0887) (0.0757) (0.0811) (0.0911) (0.0904) (0.0767) (0.0850) 
Initial 
R_GDP_PC 
-
0.000422 
-
0.000425 
-
0.000442
** 
-
0.000439
* 
-
0.000440
** 
-
0.000424
* 
-
0.000422 
-
0.000432
* 
 (0.00027
7) 
(0.00026
2) 
(0.000223
) 
(0.00025
3) 
(0.000222
) 
(0.00024
9) 
(0.00027
9) 
(0.00022
9) 
G_GDP -0.117 -0.103 -0.111 -0.123 -0.0998 -0.117 -0.115 -0.109 
 (0.251) (0.303) (0.258) (0.247) (0.285) (0.268) (0.255) (0.273) 
I_GDP 0.198* 0.199* 0.201* 0.199* 0.193* 0.197* 0.193* 0.199* 
 (0.113) (0.109) (0.107) (0.109) (0.117) (0.108) (0.104) (0.107) 
Opn 0.0686**
* 
0.0661**
* 
0.0644**
* 
0.0672**
* 
0.0641**
* 
0.0692** 0.0694**
* 
0.0661**
* 
 (0.0151) (0.0240) (0.0235) (0.0165) (0.0231) (0.0280) (0.0170) (0.0256) 
Pop_G -1.653** -1.673** -1.695** -1.681** -1.673** -1.628** -1.630** -1.665** 
 (0.831) (0.789) (0.772) (0.756) (0.809) (0.779) (0.745) (0.756) 
C_C  0.420**       
  (3.058)       
R_L   0.821*      
   (2.875)      
R_Q    0.486     
    (1.232)     
G_E     0.889    
     (3.257)    
P_S      0.0265   
      (3.572)   
V_A       0.209  
       (2.298)  
INS        0.223** 
        (1.477) 
Constant -1.293 -1.060 -0.667 -0.740 -0.558 -1.363 -1.411 -1.014 
 (3.973) (2.962) (2.694) (3.312) (2.531) (2.648) (3.337) (2.769) 
         
Total 
Observation
s 
288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Total 
Countries 
24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Over all institutional measure (institutional index) also has a positive and significant 
impact on the economic growth as measured by per capita GDP growth. The estimated 
coefficient for composite measure is 0.223 which is significant at 5 percent (Table 3). These 
findings suggest that institutions, especially control of corruption and maintenance of rule and 
law, are important in determining the long run growth prospects of the nations.  
To test the hypothesis whether the impact of institution on economic growth varies with 
the stages of economic development, we re-estimate the panel for South Asia which is relatively 
poor region and East Asia which is relatively rich region. Results for panel estimates for South 
Asia and East Asia regions are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.  
Results show that institutions are important for growth in South Asia as well as in East 
Asia. However the estimated impact of institution on economic growth is high in East Asia as 
compare to South Asia. The estimated coefficient of Control of Corruption is 0.609 (significant 
at 5 percent) for South Asian economies, while it is 1.689 (significant at 1 percent) for East 
Asian countries. Similarly the estimated impact of Rule of Law is 0.255 (significant at 10 
percent) for South Asia and 2.649 (significant at 5 percent) for East Asia. Institutions for 
Regulatory Quality are highly significant (at 1 percent) East Asian countries while insignificant 
for South Asian countries.  
Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Voice and Accountability have 
expected positive sign, but are statistically insignificant in both samples. However, the 
magnitudes of coefficient for these three variables are higher in East Asia countries as compare 
to South Asian economies (see Table 4 & Table 5).  
The overall institutional variable has positive and statistically significant impact on both 
samples. However, the coefficient of composite institutional index for East Asia (1.158, 
significant at 5 percent; see Table 5) is high as compare to South Asia (0.418, significant at 5 
percent; see Table 4). Thus, our findings suggest that role of institution in determining the long 
run economic growth also depends on the level of development a country has.  
TABLE 4 
Panel estimation South Asia Sample SYS-GMM (1996-2008) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Mode 8 
R_GDP_PC
(-1) 
-0.182 -0.188 -0.178 -0.215 -0.234 -0.223 -0.186 -0.199 
 (0.153) (0.156) (0.160) (0.167) (0.172) (0.151) (0.155) (0.168) 
Initial 
R_GDP_PC 
0.000690 0.000775 0.000603 0.00106 0.000759 0.00101 0.000844 0.000899 
 (0.00104) (0.00090
0) 
(0.00114) (0.00097
9) 
(0.00099
2) 
(0.00088
7) 
(0.00133) (0.00100) 
G_GDP -0.178 -0.177 -0.187 -0.171 -0.132 -0.168 -0.263** -0.160 
 (0.165) (0.173) (0.140) (0.171) (0.171) (0.167) (0.122) (0.160) 
I_GDP 0.0534 0.0459 0.0670 0.0388 0.0413 0.0476 0.0831 0.0417 
 (0.0774) (0.0821) (0.0733) (0.0776) (0.0877) (0.0763) (0.0605) (0.0795) 
Opn 0.0678**
* 
0.0664**
* 
0.0679**
* 
0.0735**
* 
0.0675**
* 
0.0662**
* 
0.0786**
* 
0.0668**
* 
 (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0247) (0.0257) (0.0251) (0.0196) (0.0214) 
Pop_G 1.007 0.898 1.023 1.358 0.436 0.608 1.505 1.060 
 (3.093) (2.942) (3.139) (2.756) (2.770) (2.593) (3.487) (2.956) 
C_C  0.609**       
  (1.242)       
R_L   0.255***      
   (1.240)      
R_Q    -0.952     
    (0.884)     
G_E     2.114    
     (1.090)    
P_S      1.971   
      (1.317)   
V_A       1.814  
       (1.932)  
INS        0.418** 
        (0.648) 
Constant -2.432 -2.376 -2.494 -4.706 -2.562 -2.755 -3.114 -3.061 
 (7.046) (6.593) (7.289) (6.836) (6.261) (6.445) (7.777) (6.820) 
         
Total 
Observation
s 
96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Number of 
panel 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Panel estimation East Asia Sample SYS-GMM (1996-2008) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Mode 8 
R_GDP_PC(
-1) 
0.177* 0.183* 0.150 0.0766 0.189* 0.122 0.177* 0.164 
 (0.0917) (0.104) (0.130) (0.115) (0.101) (0.142) (0.0912) (0.125) 
Initial 
R_GDP_PC 
-8.73e-05 -8.04e-
05 
-0.000131 -5.07e-
05 
-0.000102 1.79e-
05 
-7.17e-
05 
-8.98e-
05 
 (0.000102
) 
(7.14e-
05) 
(0.000132
) 
(8.92e-
05) 
(0.000133
) 
(4.74e-
05) 
(9.25e-
05) 
(9.57e-
05) 
G_GDP -0.318 -0.394 -0.563 -0.345 -0.413 -0.346 -0.149 -0.511 
 (0.301) (0.403) (0.518) (0.412) (0.522) (0.412) (0.369) (0.526) 
I_GDP 0.0404 0.0785 0.100 0.0920 0.0625 0.164 0.0102 0.107 
 (0.0982) (0.133) (0.141) (0.0852) (0.148) (0.127) (0.101) (0.153) 
Opn 0.00257 -0.0121 -0.0193 -0.0159 -0.00517 -0.0282 0.0121 -0.0202 
 (0.0182) (0.0277) (0.0232) (0.0225) (0.0241) (0.0318
) 
(0.0180) (0.0293) 
Pop_G 5.181*** 4.934**
* 
4.373*** 4.737**
* 
4.838*** 3.754** 5.695**
* 
4.313**
* 
 (1.969) (1.589) (1.530) (1.695) (1.791) (1.508) (1.980) (1.329) 
C_C  1.689*       
  (2.877)       
R_L   2.649**      
   (2.785)      
R_Q    4.202*     
    (2.203)     
G_E     0.753    
     (3.032)    
P_S      5.292   
      (3.722)   
V_A       1.331  
       (1.509)  
INS        1.158** 
        (1.421) 
Constant 2.657 3.852 7.119 1.884 4.326 0.895 -0.461 5.158 
 (2.705) (2.919) (4.902) (2.222) (5.743) (3.159) (4.341) (3.936) 
         
Total 
Observations 
72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Number of 
panel 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in the parentheses. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the growth effects of institutions at various stages of 
development. The outcome of this study, on one hand, supports the main hypothesis that the 
institutions do impact in a positive way on economic growth. More specifically, control of 
corruption and maintenance of rule and law are important in determining the long run growth 
prospects of the nations. On the other hand, findings suggest that the impact of institution on 
economic growth varies with the stages of economic development. The estimated impact of 
institution on economic growth is relatively higher in East Asian countries than South Asian 
countries implying that role of institution in determining the long run economic growth depends 
on the stages of economic development. Therefore, different countries require different set of 
institutions to promote long run economic growth. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A 
List of Countries 
 
 
Sr. No Name Region Sr. No Name Region 
1  Afghanistan South Asia 13  Malaysia Southeast Asia 
2  Bangladesh South Asia 14  Maldives South Asia 
3  Bhutan South Asia 15  Mongolia East Asia 
4  Brunei Southeast Asia 16  Nepal South Asia 
5  Cambodia Southeast Asia 17  North Korea East Asia 
6  China East Asia 18  Pakistan South Asia 
7  Hong Kong East Asia 19 
 Papua New 
Guinea Southeast Asia 
8  India South Asia 20  Philippines Southeast Asia 
9  Indonesia Southeast Asia 21  Singapore Southeast Asia 
10  Japan East Asia 22  Sri Lanka South Asia 
11  Laos Southeast Asia 23  Thailand Southeast Asia 
12  Macau East Asia 24  Vietnam Southeast Asia 
 
